The debate about the impact of technology on employment has always had a central role in economic theory. At the same time, the nexus of technological progress and employment might depend on macroeconomic regimes. In this work we investigate the interrelations among technology, output and employment in the U.S. economy in growth recessions vs. growth expansions. More precisely, using U.S. data we estimate different threshold vector autoregressions (TVARs) with TFP, hours, and GDP, employing the latter as threshold variable, and assess the generalized impulse responses of GDP and hours as to TFP shocks. For our entire period of observation, 1957Q1-2011Q4, positive technology shocks, while spurring GDP growth, by and large, display a negative effect on hours worked in growth recessions, but they are not significantly different from zero in good times. Yet, since the mid eighties (1984Q1-2011Q4) productivity shocks increase hours worked in low growth periods. The results are mainly driven by the response of labor along the extensive margin (number of employees), and remain persistent so in the face of a battery of robustness checks.
Introduction
In this work we estimate several threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) models to investigate the interrelations between productivity, output and employment in different states of the U.S. economy (growth recessions vs. growth expansions) since the WWII. In this respect, the debate about the (positive or negative) impact of technology on employment has always had a central role in economic theory (see Vivarelli 2007 , for a survey), from Ricardo to the more recent discussion about automation (Acemoglu/Restrepo 2017) , "The Second Machine Age" and the job destroying effects related to the so-called fourth industrial revolution (e. g. Brynjolfsson/McAfee2014; Ford 2015) . At the business cycle frequencies, the controversy about the impact of technology shocks on employment is not completely settled. In Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, TFP shocks positively affect output and hours worked both in the short run and in the long run. However, several contributions (e. g. Gali 1999; Francis/Ramey 2005b; Basu et al. 2006 ) have questioned such results, finding that technology has a negative impact on worked hours in the short run, whereas the relation can switch from negative to positive in the longer run (Chen/Semmler 2018; Gallegati et al. 2014) .
A more recent stream of literature has found that non-linearities in the economic system can lead to a different impact of (e. g. monetary and fiscal) shocks depending on the state of the economy (see e. g. Auerbach/Gorodnichenko 2012; Mittnik/Semmler 2012) and of financial markets (Mittnik/Semmler 2013; Ferraresi et al. 2014; Schleer/Semmler 2015; 2016) . In this respect, the impact of technology shocks might depend on the state of the economy as their properties and the transmission mechanisms at work vary over the business cycle. In particular, the responses of employment and output might depend on (i) the "content" of technology shocks themselves (see, e. g. Hershbein/Kahn 2018, for the state dependence of routine biased technical change) as well as their permanent vs. transitory nature (Sims 2011) ; (ii) the state of aggregate demand and the monetary and fiscal policy regimes (see e. g. Gali/Rabanal 2004) ; and (iii) the changing nature of recessions and the role played by financial markets (see, e. g. Petrosky-Nadeau 2013).
Finally, further empirical regularities stemming from recent macroeconomic research state milder effects of technology shocks on employment since the mid eighties (e. g. Gali et al. 2003; Gali/Gambetti 2009 ) and call for a deeper investigation of whether such time varying dynamics originates from the responses of employment in growth recessions vs. growth expansions.
In line with the conjectures coming from the aforementioned literature, we investigate the possible interrelations between technology, output and employ-ment in a non-linear, state dependent framework. More precisely, we estimate over several time spans (the longest being 1957Q1-2011Q4) different threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) models with TFP, hours, and GDP, employing the latter as threshold variable. We then assess the dynamics of the ensuing generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) to study whether TFP shocks affect differently hours and GDP in good vis-à-vis bad times. Finally, we also investigate whether the structural break in the relationship between productivity and employment identified by existing literature (1957Q1-1979Q2 vs. 1984Q1-2011Q4) , might have differently impacted the responses of hours and output as to technology shocks in growth recessions vis-à-vis growth expansions or both.
Our results, in a nutshell, are the following. Positive TFP shocks spur GDP growth, but display a negative effect on hours worked at least on impact, independently of the state of the economy. In the longest time period, the effects of productivity shocks on employment are abundantly negative during growth recessions, but they are not significantly different from zero in good times. In that, our work zooms in the aforementioned results of Gali (1999) and Basu et al. (2006) in finding that the negative response of employment as to technology shocks is due to the dynamics activated during growth recessions. We also find that the dynamics of hours worked in the aftermath of a technology shock is mostly due to the response of the number of employees rather than hours per worker. Adjustments via the extensive margin appear then more relevant than those occurring along the intensive margin.
However, our results also suggest that the chosen time period affects how hours and GDP react to TFP shocks in good or bad times. Prior to the mid eighties, the results are in line with those obtained in the longest period; whereas, since the Great Moderation, positive technology shocks increase hours in growth downturns. Such results are preserved also when the Great Recession is taken into account. Our analysis adds a further degree of precision to the results in Gali et al. (2003) and Gali and Gambetti (2009) about the milder effects of TFP shocks on employment during the Great Moderation. Indeed, we show that low growth periods are responsible for the switch in the observed pattern.
Our results remain consistent with a wide set of robustness checks, in terms of model specification, estimation and different time breaks, as documented in Section 5.3 and in the Online Appendix to this work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the methodology and the data. We discuss our main results in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude.
Related literature
Our work is related to two different streams of literature. The first one studies the effects of technology shocks on output and employment (Gali 1999; Basu et al. 2006; Hölzl/Reinstaller 2005) . According to this strand of research, technology shocks generate negative comovements between productivity and hours worked and between output and hours which are at odds with results from standard real business cycle (RBC) models (Kydland/Prescott 1982; Breitung/Heinemann 1998) that postulate positive relationships (see Ramey 2016; Gali/Rabanal 2004 , for a comprehensive discussion). However, the debate about the effects of technology shocks on employment and output is not completely settled. Indeed, different specifications and identification strategies can yield different results (e. g. Gali/Rabanal 2004; Christiano et al. 2003; Fernald 2007 Dedola/Neri 2007 Lindé 2009 ), even though most of them conveys the message of contractionary effects of technology shocks with respect to hours worked (at least in the short run). 1 This strand of research is complemented by further evidence about the time varying effects of technology shocks, which are thought to have become less contractionary during the Great Moderation era (e. g. Gali/Gambetti 2009; Gali et al. 2003) . Moreover, Ng and Wright (2013) find that the procyclicality of labor productivity has been weakened since the mid eighties (see also Fernald/Wang 2015) .
These results have called for different theoretical rationalizations. In a (New Keynesian) sticky-price framework, aggregate demand and the stabilization role played by monetary policy in accommodating technology shocks are crucial. For instance, as discussed in Gali (1999) , in models with predetermined prices, a technology shock leaves real balances (and therefore aggregate demand) unchanged. Since firms need less labor to produce the same output, a short run decrease of employment, whose intensity depends on the reactivity of monetary policy, follows. 2 In an RBC model, if one allows the effects of technology to diffuse slowly within the economy, hours worked may actually fall on impact as individuals 1 The main differences arise because of (i) hours entering the relation in first-differences (Gali 1999; Francis/Ramey 2005b) vs. levels (Christiano et al. 2003) ; (ii) long run restrictions and adjusted TFP measure of technology (Gali 1999; Basu et al. 2006) vs. sign restrictions (Dedola and Neri 2007) ; identification of different sources of technical change (Fisher 2006) . In the present work we stick to first differenced hours, so as to avoid to uncover spurious regime change. Nevertheless, our results are broadly robust to different specifications. Moreover, we identify technology shocks by using the adjusted measure of TFP proposed by Fernald (2012) , in line with Basu et al. (2006) . 2 The changing framework for monetary and fiscal policies and their interactions since the mid eighties has been advocated as one of the sources of the shift in the interrelations between technology shocks and hours worked entering the Great Moderation (e. g. Gali et al. 2003). substitute consumption for more leisure at the beginning (Lindé 2009 A second stream of literature which is relevant for our work studies regime switching in macroeconomic dynamics. This relatively new strand of research has blossomed in the aftermath of the Great Recession and investigates the asymmetric effects of fiscal and monetary policies as well as of other real and financial shocks, depending on the state of the economy. Generally, such studies resort to a wide set of regime switching models ranging from threshold vector autoregressions (TVAR), to vector smooth transition autoregressions (VSTAR) and Markov-Switching models. Regimes shifts are usually sparked by threshold variables related to the state of the real economy (recession or expansion, see e. g. Auerbach/Gorodnichenko 2012; Bachmann/Sims 2012; Mittnik/Semmler 2012; Ferri et al. 2001 ), or to financial markets (see e. g. Mittnik/Semmler 2013; Ferraresi et al. 2014; Gevorkyan/Semmler 2016; Schleer/Semmler 2015; 2016) . 3 As to the relevance of the latter strand of research for our framework, there are various ways through which technology shocks may differently affect output and employment depending on the state of the economy. First, the nature of technology shocks might change over the business cycle and alter their overall impact on macroeconomic dynamics. For instance, the relative shares of the "transitory" vs. "permanent" components of technology shocks have been demonstrated to affect the response of hours worked (Sims e. g. in 2011 , transitory technology shocks increase hours worked and permanent technology shocks decrease them). Moreover, skill biased technical change complements (i. e. increases) high skill employment (Acemoglu 2002a,b) , potentially reducing the intensity of labor substitution induced by technology shocks. In this vein, Hershbein and Kahn (2018) find that routine-biased technical change has increased during the Great Recession, possibly inducing milder effects of technology shocks on employment. Second, the transmission mechanisms at work in propagating the shocks might be state dependent. For instance, the speed of diffusion of technology shocks might change over the business cycle, due to "wait-and-see" strategies (Barlevy 2007) or due to the action of financial markets (Petrosky-Nadeau 2013), and this might in turn impact the response of hours (Lindé 2009 ). Moreover, aggregate demand and government policies have been demonstrated to exert a pivotal role (Gali 1999) . In this vein, both the monetary and the fiscal stances might turn to accommodative during recessions, and at the same time their effectiveness could change over the business cycle (e. g. Auerbach/Gorodnichenko 2012; Ferraresi et al. 2014; Mittnik/Semmler 2012) . In this context, confidence is key in shaping the response of both output and hours worked as to real and nominal shocks, especially in bad times ( (Weder 2000) ; Bachmann/Sims 2012).
Concerning the above mentioned evidence about the milder effects of technology shocks on employment since the mid eighties, the same forces shaping the different responses of hours and output over the business cycle might have altered their dynamics differently in good times vs. bad times at the dawn of the Great Moderation. For instance, the rise of skill biased technical change is deeply intertwined with the computer revolution (e. g. Acemoglu 2002b), whereas the weaker negative impact of technology shocks on hours has also been attributed to the diverse conduct in terms of monetary policy (e. g. Gali et al. 2003) , or to the reduced volatility characterizing productivity during the Great Moderation (Benigno et al. 2015) . Those changes demand then for an investigation which takes into account the potential break in the interrelations between technology, hours and output since the mid eighties.
In the analysis that follows we borrow from the aforementioned streams of literature and investigate (i) whether technology shocks differently impact employment and output depending on the state of the economy (i. e. via growth recessions vis-à-vis growth expansions regimes) and (ii) if the changing impact of such shocks over time (i. e. the milder effects of technology shocks since the mid eighties) is originating in the dynamics taking place over business cycle regimes (i. e. one of the two regimes -or both -is -are -responsible for the observed changes), with some of the long term transformations evoked above differently impacting macroeconomic dynamics in good times vs. bad times.
Methodology
In order to assess whether the responses of hours and GDP with respect to technology shocks depend on the state of the economy, we estimate a bunch of threshold vector autoregressions (TVARs) which display a number of appealing features. First, the threshold variable is considered as endogenous. This allows one to study regime switches which result from shocks hitting all the variables within the system. Second, TVARs are very simple to estimate: within each regime, the parameters can be recovered by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, once estimated, the state dependent dynamics of TVARs allows for non-linear and asymmetric impulse response functions.
Let us consider a TVAR model with two regimes. Given the vector of endogenous variables (y) and the threshold variable (w, belonging to y), the model can be represented as follows:
where c j is a constant vector; j = 1 if w t-d < r and j = 2 otherwise; r is the value of the threshold; d is the lag of the threshold variable relevant for regime changes; p is the autoregressive order; and A j,i is the matrix of coefficients of regime j and lag i. Each regime is characterized by a variance-covariance matrix G j . Note that the TVAR model is linear within each regime, but the changes in the parameters across regimes account for non-linearities. 4 TVARs can be estimated via OLS conditional on the threshold variable, w t-d , the number of regimes and the lag order p. 5 Identification can be performed employing standard procedures used in the linear framework (e. g. Cholesky decomposition).
Before estimation and identification, one has first to test for linearity. We apply a battery of Tsay (1998) tests in order to evaluate the null hypothesis that our VAR models are linear. If the null is rejected, there are multiple regimes, and we can estimate a threshold model. As suggested by Tsay (1998) , we select the lag of the threshold variable according to the maximum test statistic. We then search over the (observed) threshold values and choose the one which minimizes the sum of squared residuals. 6 After the TVAR is estimated, the next step consists in analyzing the impulse response functions. In a non-linear setup, the reaction of an endogenous variable to a shock depends on the past history, the state of the economy and the size of the shock under study at time 0, and the size and the sign of all the shocks hitting the economy within the period of interest (a shock at time t may indeed trigger a switching of regime at time t + d, where d is the estimated lag of the threshold). In order to average out the influences of history and of all other shocks, simulation methods are necessary to recover the generalized impulse response functions 4 A TVAR model can be seen as a special case of a more general class of models, notably that of Vector Smooth Transition Autoregressions (VSTARs). More precisely, a VSTAR collapses to a TVAR as the speed of transition from one state to the other goes to infinity. Whereas less general in principle, a TVAR can be seen as a sensible approximation of macroeconomic dynamics in cases like ours in which the states under investigation (i. e. business cycle regimes) are likely either to persist or switch at the chosen data frequency (i. e. quarters). Furthermore, the cost of the loss in generality comes with the advantage of a far greater tractability. 5 The lag order can be selected by resorting to standard methods (here the Bayesian Information Criterion, BIC), applied to the linear model whose linearity has to be tested. 6 Alternatively, we can select the lag of the threshold according to the sum of squared residuals. Our results are nevertheless robust to the estimation method employed. See Section 5.3 and the Online Appendix.
(GIRFs; Koop et al. 1996) . In particular, if we define % t as the shock to the variable we are interested in, a horizon m, and a history K t-1 , we can define the GIRF as:
The algorithm employed to derive the generalized impulse response function is described in Appendix B. In a nutshell, the idea is to simulate the model for any possible starting point over the time horizon of interest by feeding the system with bootstrapped shocks and to repeat the exercise by adding a new shock of a specific size. The procedure is replicated hundreds times with newly generated series of bootstrapped residuals. The responses to shocks specific to a particular regime are recovered by averaging out the simulation results. As suggested in Zheng (2013) and Schmidt (2013) , we compute confidence bands by bootstrapping the TVAR residuals (see Appendix B for the algorithm). In the GIRFs presented below, we report 68% confidence bands as suggested by Sims and Zha (1999) . 7
Data and model
We use quarterly U.S. time series from 1957Q1 to 2011Q4. Such a long time span allows us to increase the minimum number of observations in each regime and to perform a relatively large number of exercises with different sub-samples. Following Basu et al. (2006) we identify technology shocks by using an utilization adjusted measure of total factor productivity (TFP). Our model then contains (according to the Cholesky order) adjusted TFP, built by Fernald (2012) following Basu et al. (2006) , GDP and hours worked. 8 The series are reported in Figure 10 in Appendix C.
We first estimate the model over the whole sample and then focus on different sub-periods in order to account for possible structural breaks. First, we exclude the Great Recession, letting our sample go to the second quarter of 2008. We then perform an investigation in the spirit of Gali et al. (2003) to separate the pre-Volcker era (1957Q1-1979Q2) from the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke period 7 Codes for linearity tests, estimation, GIRFs and bootstrapped confidence bands are written in Gretl, an open-source software available at http://gretl.sourceforge.net/. 8 Refer to Appendix A for more information about the data sources. The data is nevertheless available from the authors upon request.
(1984Q1-2011Q4). 9 Finally, we also jettison the Great Recession from the Great Moderation, considering the period 1984Q1-2008Q2 and show that our results are not qualitatively affected. 10 We rely on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) so as to select the lag structure of each model, which turns out to be 1 in any of the examined specifications and samples displayed in Table 2 . 11 We order adjusted TFP first in our TVAR, as the residuals of such equation, once the series has been purged from cyclical factors, should not be contemporaneously correlated with the other ones. This is in line with theoretical macroeconomic literature (e. g. real business cycle models) as well as with standard empirical methods to identify technology shocks (Basu et al. 2006) . 12 We then place GDP and finally hours worked. In other words, we assume that shocks to GDP are contemporaneously transmitted to hours worked (i. e. higher production requires more labor input) but not viceversa. 13 Our threshold variable is a moving average of order 4 of the quarterly rate of change of GDP, which in turn is nothing but a rescaled yearly rate of change (see Figure 10 in the Appendix C). Yearly rates of change can be considered a rough measure to extract business cycle components (Giannone et al. 2009 ) and growth recessions in the spirit of Stock and Watson (1999) and Zarnowitz (1992) , with the advantage that we can track their dynamics endogenously within the TVAR. Moreover, modern macroeconomic theory has justified them as general sources of 9 An alternative approach would embed time varying coefficients in the model since the beginning (Gali/Gambetti 2009 ), yet a set up allowing for non-linear dynamics due to the state of the economy would make the estimation of a time varying VAR hardly feasible. Following our strategy we retrieve from existing literature the potential dates for the breaks in the relations under investigation. Moreover, for robustness, in Section 5.3 we perform a rolling window exercise showing how the most important shifts in the response of hours worked as to technology shocks take place around the chosen dates. 10 Moreover, we also check for an alternative sub-sampling strategy, in line with the trend breaks in labor productivity growth identified by Fernald (2007) . See Section 5.3 and the Online Appendix for further details. 11 The BIC tends to select parsimonious models, which is a desirable in context like ours, characterized by a multiple regime specification. An alternative way to preserve parsimony and allow for a richer lag length is constituted by the methodology suggested by Winker (1995) , i. e. lag structure with holes (see also Winker 2000; Maringer/Winker 2004; Savin/Winker 2013) . 12 It is indeed very likely that total factor productivity, once purged from cyclical capacity utilization, does not respond to business cycle fluctuations within the same quarter. In fact, whereas standard TFP is highly correlated with GDP growth (0.8); utilization adjusted TFP is not (0.2). 13 This ordering is questionable since more hours worked should return, within the quarter, higher value added (in terms of wages). However, our results do not change if we swap the two series in the system. multi regime dynamics (Canzoneri et al. 2016) . In order to assess the mean reverting properties of the threshold variable within the different examined samples, we run a battery of augmented Dickey-Fuller (GLS) tests, whose results are reported in Table 1 . The null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is rejected for all the tested series. 
Results
Let us now present the main results obtained from our empirical analysis. We structure the discussion in three parts. First, in Section 5.1 we present the results obtained for the full sample (1957Q1-2011Q4). We then consider the pre Volcker and post mid eighties sub-samples (cf. Section 5.2). Finally, in Section 5.3, we assess the robustness of our results as to different (i) threshold values; (ii) series entering the TVARs; (iii) sub-sampling choices.
Full sample period
We begin by performing Tsay linearity tests. As shown in Table 2 , the Tsay test rejects linearity. The max test statistics is reached at lag one, which we then impose in our estimation procedure. The estimated threshold is 1% and leaves 85 observations in good times and 135 in growth recessions. Figure 1 reports the threshold variable together with the threshold value and the estimated growth recessions. It also suggests that after the mid eighties, the drop in GDP volatility has also coincided with a fall in the mean of the threshold variable, possibly making the estimated threshold too high, so that the model spends too much time in the low growth regime (more on this in Section 5.2 below; in particular, see Figure 4 ). Let us now consider the estimated impulse response function of GDP and hours worked as to positive technology shocks (cf. Figure 2) . The GIRFs show that TFP shocks spur GDP in growth expansions, whereas their impact is much milder and not significantly different from zero during bad times. In contrast, positive technology shocks considerably reduce employment during growth recessions, whereas their effects are negligible in good times (Figure 2) .
Our results suggest the existence of state dependent transmission channels of technology shocks to output and employment. In that, they elaborate further on the findings of Gali (1999) , suggesting that the RBC explanation of business cycles is not credible as it implies a positive correlation between productivity and hours. Indeed, we find that such results are mainly due to the behavior of the economy in growth downturns. We then try to shed more light on the effects of technology shocks by comparing the response of employment over the extensive margin (i. e. number of employees) vis-à-vis the intensive one (i. e. hours per worker). More specifically, we replace total hours in the TVAR model with either the number of employees or the average weekly hours; we test for linearity (Table 2) ; we estimate the models and compute the ensuing GIRFs. Let us start with average weekly hours (Fernald/Wang 2015) . The impulse response functions depict quite similar patterns in the two macroeconomic regimes (cf. Figure 3) . On the contrary, the reaction of the number of employees mimics closely that of total hours, suggesting that most of the labor adjustment is done over the extensive margin (see Figure 3) . Indeed, the stronger and negative effects of productivity shocks on employment in the low growth regime depend mostly on the lower number of employees. 
Sub-sample analysis
As aforementioned, the relationship between technology, output and employment may be subject to structural breaks and change over time. Indeed, as shown by e. g. Gali et al. (2003) and Gali and Gambetti (2009) among others, since the mid eighties, the effects of technology shocks on hours worked have become milder. Moreover, Figure 1 suggests that the behavior of the threshold variable seems to have mutated during the Great Moderation. Building on the existing literature, we assess whether such dynamics is also present in a state dependent framework, as the phenomena which contribute the most to the changes within the linear relation may differently affect the results depending on the state of the economy. For instance, if the response of employment depends to some extent to the degree of accommodation of monetary policy, and if the transmission channels activated by the latter are more effective in growth recessions (expansions), we should expect the effects of switches in the monetary policy regime (e. g. the parameters of the Taylor rule) to have a different impact in good times vis-à-vis bad times.
In order to perform our analysis we divide the sample into two sub-periods. In particular, we consider the pre-Volcker era (1957Q1-1979Q2) and the VolckerGreenspan-Bernanke period (1984Q1-2011Q4), which includes the Great Recession. 14 The inclusion of the Great Recession in our second sub-sample follows from Ng and Wright (2013) who claim that the post mid 80s recessions share a relevant set of common features (e. g. financial origins; jobless recoveries; tight credit in the ensuing expansions), among which is the vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity (see also Fernald/Wang Fernald and Wang 2015) . Nonetheless, we also perform our analysis without it and results are not qualitatively affected.
The Tsay tests reject linearity in both samples, as reported in Table 2 , even though the evidence for the second sub-sample is weaker (10% significance level). However, notice that for the specification in which hours and GDP are normalized with the US population linearity is still rejected at 5%. Figure 4 displays the threshold variable, the estimated threshold values and growth recessions for the two sub-periods. The threshold value does not change within the pre-Volcker period as to the whole sample, whereas it is lower in the post mid eighties sample. Moreover, the estimated lags relevant for the regime switching increase from one to three in the second sub-period. 15 We find 14 We follow Gali et al. (2003) and exclude the 1979Q3-1982Q2 period from the analysis. Moreover, following the existing literature about the timing of the Great Moderation, we start our second sub-sample in 1984Q1 (see e. g. Stock and Watson 2003) . 15 Notice however that the order of the TVAR selected by the BIC is 1 for both sub-samples. 43 observations in growth expansions and 47 in growth downturns in the first sub-samples, while 50 and 62, respectively, in the latter one. Let us now consider the GIRFs for the two sub-samples. The results of the pre-Volcker period are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained with the whole sample (cf. Figure 5 ). More precisely, the negative effects of positive technology shocks on employment are abundantly stronger and negative in growth downturns. In fact, within this sub-period, the effects appear even reinforced with respect to what observed for the whole sample. The point estimates of the response of GDP itself, although not significantly different from zero, turn negative after few quarters in bad times.
On the contrary, in the second sub-period, the generalized impulse response functions depict a different story. In this case, the responses in good times do not qualitatively change, but the ones in bad times are completely different (see Figure 6 ). Indeed, positive technology shocks appear to stimulate both GDP and hours during growth recessions. Our results then zoom in the analyses of Gali et al. (2003) and Gali and Gambetti (2009) : the milder effects of TFP shocks since the mid eighties are due to the responses of hours and GDP in bad times.
What is the source of the different dynamics of employment in the two subperiods? In order to understand it we now study disaggregated employment series comparing the dynamics of number of employees (extensive margin) with that of average weekly hours per worker (intensive margin). The impulse response functions of average weekly hours show small differences in the dynamics of the series after a technology shock in the two sub-samples (Figures 7 and 8) . In both regimes, the initial response is negative and the patterns of the GIRFs are substantially flat. However, in the second period the response over the intensive margin in bad times is close to zero and never positive, whereas no similar shift characterizes the response in good times. On the contrary, the GIRFs of the number of employees closely track (again) the reactions of total hours. This implies that firms mostly adjust employment over the extensive margin (Figures 7 and 8) . Such results cast further doubts on the RBC interpretation of technology shocks. Indeed, positive TFP shocks do not lead to more intense labor effort, but rather they appear to affect employment, acting via an increase of the number of people at work.
Robustness analysis
Let us assess the robustness of our results as to modifications in the setup of our exercise. First, we normalize GDP and hours by dividing the series by the US civilian population. Second, we change the threshold values in the different samples. Finally, we control for the timing of the break. Indeed, in addition to the pre and post Volcker sub-periods, we also consider the dates for possible structural breaks in U.S. labor productivity (i. e. 1973Q2; 1995Q4; 2003Q4) proposed by Fernald (2007 Fernald ( , 2014 . We accordingly obtain three different sub-periods: 1957Q1-1973Q2, 1984Q1-1995Q4 and 1996Q1-2003Q4 . Finally, we report the results from a rolling window exercise empirically assessing the date(s) of the shift(s) in the responses of hours in growth recessions vs. growth expansions. The main results from all the checks briefly discussed here are reported in the Online Appendix to the present work.
Normalized GDP and hours. In the benchmark model, GDP and worked hours are expressed in aggregate terms. We test the robustness of our result by normalizing the series through the civilian population as in Gali (1999) . Again, both GDP and hours are held in first differences. The results are qualitatively similar. First, the Tsay tests reject linearity in all the samples (cf. Table 2 ). Second, we obtain the same results reported above for the (i) full sample; (ii) pre-Volcker period; (iii) Great Moderation cum Great Recession period. Moreover, the results are confirmed for the pre-Volcker vs. post mid 80s period even when we consider normalized hours in levels as suggested by Christiano et al. (2003) .
Different threshold values. Since our results may be sensitive to the value and the number of lags of the estimated threshold, we check whether they are robust to changes in the estimation procedure. First, we employ the median value of the threshold variable at each lag. Second, we perform estimation searching for the model minimizing the sum of squared residuals at all lags. Again, the results do not qualitatively change.
Different sub-samples. With respect to our sub-sampling strategy, another possible source of breaks stems from the rate of growth of labor productivity. Indeed, according to Fernald (2007 Fernald ( , 2014 , labor productivity growth has been characterized by major changes over the post WWII periods, with high growth periods (1957Q1-1973Q2 and 1996Q1-2003Q4) being followed by low growth years 1973Q3-1995Q4 and 2004Q1-2011Q4) . Starting from our sub-samples (1957Q1-1979Q2 and 1984Q1-2011Q4) , we narrow our analysis controlling whether our results change if we concentrate upon shorter time periods, namely, the preVolcker high productivity growth period (1957Q1-1973Q2) ; the Great Moderation low productivity growth era (1984Q1-1995Q4) , and the Great Moderation high productivity growth sample (1996Q1-2003Q4). 16 We find that the results do not qualitatively differ from those obtained from our main sub-samples.
To add further robustness to our results we also report results from a rolling window exercise so as to test the consistency of the selected time breaks. More precisely, we estimate and compute the generalized impulse response functions from TVARs over different (20 years) time spans since 1957Q1-1976Q4 to 1992Q1-2011Q4 and check the response of hours worked as to technology shocks 10 quarters after the shock. 17 The results in Figure 9 show that whereas not much variation characterizes the high growth regime (also in relation to the amplitude of confidence bands around impulse response functions for the two chosen subsamples; see Figures 5 and 6 in Section 5.2), a clear break point in the relation of technology and employment for the low growth period has to be dated around the mid eighties, in line with the prevalent literature about the beginning of the Great Moderation (e. g. Stock and Watson 2003) . 18
Figure 9: Response of hours after 10 quarters as to a 1% sd shock to TFP. 20 years rolling windows. Threshold fixed at the median value of each sample, lag 1.
Discussion and concluding remarks
In the current work, we contribute to the literature about the short run effects of technology shocks on employment and output by showing that there are diverse effects arising from different states of the economy. Indeed, the impulse response functions resulting from our TVAR models show that positive technology shocks spur GDP in growth expansions, while their impact is not significantly different from zero in growth recessions. On the contrary, TFP shocks have contractionary effects on hours in bad times and almost insignificant effects in good times. Thus, our results zoom in the work of Gali (1999) and Basu et al. (2006) . We also find that the response of aggregate hours to TFP shocks is mainly driven by the reaction of 17 We impose as threshold the median values of the threshold variable at lag 1 in each investigated window. R and B (see Appendix B) are both fixed at 200. 18 In the Online Appendix we report results for a different rolling window length. the number of employees (extensive margin) rather than that of hours per worker (intensive margin).
Looking at broader and more long term macroeconomic regimes, beyond the above mentioned state dependent effects, in line with the prevailing literature (e. g. Gali et al. 2003 ; Gali/Gambetti 2009), we also uncover a structural break in the reaction of GDP and employment as to technology shocks. Indeed, mainly during the Great Moderation, TFP shocks stimulate both hours and output in bad times: the milder effects of technology shocks on hours since the mid eigthies are mainly due to the responses of employment and GDP in growth recessions.
Our research can be expanded in several directions. First, we can further study the transmission channels responsible for the different patterns observed since the beginning of the Great Moderation. Indeed, the uncovered shifts in impulse response functions call for a deeper investigation of their potential causes. In particular, as briefly discussed in Section 2, changes (i) in the internal composition of the shocks (e. g. rise of routine-biased technical component; relative size of temporary vs. permanent components), (ii) in the reaction of aggregate demand and the degree of accommodation of fiscal and monetary policies, and (iii) in the speed of diffusion of the shocks; might have altered the reaction of hours worked in the wake of technology shocks (e. g. throughout a different behavior of financial markets). A deeper look at the content of technology shocks over the business cycle, prior and after the mid 80s, would also help to reconcile the results stemming from the technology shocks literature with those concerning the job destroying effect of automation (e. g. Acemoglu/Restrepo 2017) and the impact of technology on inequality (e. g. IMF 2017). In this respect, consistently with our results, Autor and Salomons (2018) have recently found that the job destroying effect of technology at the industry level disappears once one looks at the response of the whole economy, due to employment shifts from technology advanced sectors to the laggard ones; whereas a similar balancing doesn't hold for inequality.
Second, we could employ wavelet analysis (Gallegati et al. 2014 ) to uncover possible changing patterns in the relation between employment and productivity at different time scales, since one might observe different causal relationships in the short and medium run, as compared to the very long run.
Third, non-linear cointegration analysis (Enders 2008; Candelon/Lieb 2013 ) could be applied to assess whether the long and short run relations among technology, GDP and employment are affected by regime dependent dynamics as well as by the structural change observed since the mid eighties.
Fourth, since our results open up the issue whether the different growth trends in productivity growth may be connected with the observed patterns in the relation between technology and employment, one should investigate the drivers of productivity growth over different time scales, looking at business cycle as well as at longer run macroeconomic regimes.
Finally, as much as long run macroeconomic time series data are available for the Euro area, one could undertake, along the line as has been started in Cette et al. (2016) , a similar study on the Euro-area.
C Series
Figure 10: Series (first difference of natural logarithm). NBER recessions in parenthesis.
